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Druft Rccommendation
'"::,il:I";ir;,::":f ;:l:,:i::i",,f :;:;,f ;-,';:,!:{;:';;"1::'*
reply to thc annual report ofthe Council
The Assemblr'.
(r) Notrng that progrcss has fallcn bchind on thc devclopment of a Europcan secuntv and dcfcucc
rdcntrtv and that thrs calls for a reactron from thc Assemblr.
(,,) Notrng uith conccrn that the scant progrcss made rn thc Trcatv of Arnstcrdam rn a numbcr of
lmportant arcas has 91\cn nsc to drsapporntmcnt and drsrllusron among a nunrbcr of polrtrcal dccisron-
makcrs and rn polrtical oplnton rn Europcan Unron ntembcr countrrcs.
(tu) Conccrned also that thc polrtrcal rmpctus ncccssan' to crcatc "an cver cioscr unron among thc
peoples of Europe" as spccificd rn the Nlaastrrcht Trcatv might thus bc further s'cakcncd.
(rv1 Rccalhng thcreforc thc partrcular responsrbrhh' of the tcn srgnatories of thc modrficd Brussels
Treatv to gtrc practrcal effect to thcrr stated resolvc thcrcrn ''to pronrotc thc unrtv and to cncourage the
progrcsstve tntcgratton of Europc'' for u'hrch purposc thc \[IEU Councrl uas created rn 195-1.
(\') Undcrhnurg rn addition thc nccd for \\'EU
(a) lo start rvork tmmcdratclr on rmplementrng thc provlslons of Trtle V of thc Treatv of
Amstcrdam regardrng \\'EU's cnhanccd responsibrlrtrcs in breathrng lrfc rnto the CFSP- and
(b/ to provrdc fresh poirtrcal morncntum for thc pLrrpose of takrng qualrtatn'e steps to achrcvc a
cofirmon Europcan defencc.
(vt) Rccalhng that thc Amsterdanr and N1adnd dccrsror.rs rcqulrc \\'EU to take a numbcr of polrtrcal
dcctstons tn addttton to thosc cnumcratcd rn Rccommendatron 6l tl adoptcd bv thc Standrng Commrttcc
on 16 Octobcr 1997.
f'tt) Underhnrng tn parttcular the nccd for WEU to claboratc and agrce on a cornprehensrvc Euro-
pean sccuntr concept dcfinrng *'rthout ambrgurtr thc consequcnccs for WEU of thc rolc and functron
thc Europcan Unron is prcparcd to fulfil rn thc 2lst ccntun'.
fi,rrr) Strcssrng that such a conccpt must rncludc a ciear dcfinrtlon of Europc's futurc rcsponsrbrlrtrcs
tn the arcas of crtsts managcnrcnt and proper dcfcncc rn relatron to lts cooperatron urth thc Atlantrc
Alliance. and tn tltc contert of thc claboratron of a pan-European sccunt\ archrtecturc rn rr'hrch Russra,
Ukrarne and thc succcssor statcs of thc former Sovrct Unron plav a part.
(rx) Enrphasrsrng thc nced for thc tcn srgnatorrcs of thc modrficd Bnrsscls Trcatv to start uork on
adaptrng rt to WEU-s neu' rolc tn rclatron to the Europcan Unton and NATO rvtthout callrng ulto ques-
tron the corncrstonc of nrutual dcfcncc asslstancc lard dou'n rn Artrclc V of that Treatr'.
(x) Welcorrrnq thc ttmclr transuussron of the first part of thc.l3rd annual rcport of thc Councrl to
thc Asscmblr'.
(xr) \\'elcomtng thc succcssfui cfforts of \\IEU and rts nrcrnbcr states to rcstorc pohcc authorrtv and
pubhc ordcr tn a numbcr of countrtcs such as former Yugoslavra and Albanra. rn close consultatron and
coopcratron u'rth thc polrtrcal authorrtrcs of thosc countncs-
(nt) Rccalhng houcvcr that \\'EU rs f-rrst and foremost a polrtrco-mrlrtan organlsatlon and that rts
crlsls-manaqcment mlsslolls can under no crrcurnstanccs bc confincd to pohcc actrVrtrcs.
krtr) Constdcnng that thc Asscmblv has oftcn submrttcd r.rscfirl proposals to tho ('ouncrl as thc
Erfurt Dcclaratron has oncc agarn ackroulcdgcd but that thc statuton,proccdurcs for conrevrng
recommcrtdatrons adoptcd bv thc .{ss.'mblr aud for thc Councrl's rcphcs thcreto arc too sloll'to mcet thc
requlrcmcnts of a gcnurnc draloguc bcttrccn thcsc tso WEU bodrcs.
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.INCIL
I Drarv up and agree on a reused verslon of the Hague Platform taking tnto account the fundamen-
tal changcs in the international sccurity envrronment srnce 1987, in addrtion to rmplementing the meas-
ures proposcd in Recommendatron 618;
2. Include in the nen'concept a clear position on thc responsrbilities of the WEU mcmber countries
regarding the defence of Europe and the future rmplementation of Article V of the modified Brussels
Treatl rn relation to the defcncc obligations of thc mcmber countries of the Atlantrc Alliance on the
basis of Article 5 of the Washinglon Treaty and rvith regard to WEU's neu'ly' created Militarl'
Commrttec;
3 Adapt the u'ording of Article IV 2 of the modified Brussels Treatl' to the situatton created by the
estabhshment of WEU milrtary structures such as forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and of WEU's
Milrtary Committee;
4 Make fulluse of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty either
in order to take tts oun dccisions in the arca of crists managemcnt, or
- 
to give advrce to the European Union in preparing any' European Uruon decistons for the
elaboration and rmplementation of which the European Uruon urll avatl itself of WEU, rn
partrcular as regards Petersberg mtssions;
5 Takc a political decisron on the scopc WEU mtcnds to develop for its orin military capabilities
(to be used either at the request of the European Union or on its osn intttattvc) bearing rn mind that
Europe's milrtary capabilities are so hmited that WEU is not capable of undertakrng a mrlrtary opcra-
tion of a certain magnrtude urthout relf ing on NATO assets and capabiliues.
6 Establish rulcs of engagement for all areas in uhrch WEU has a prefercnce for autonomous deci-
sions rn the area of crrsrs management on the basis of the Councrl's Declaratton of 22 July 1997 (wrth
special reference to rts expenence so far in crisis sttuations such as former Yugoslavta and Albanra),
7 Start u'ork rmmediately to drarv up with thc European Unron arrangements for enhanced coop-
eratron bctx'een WEU and the Union, as set out in the Protocol appended to Article J 7 of the Trcaty of
Amstcrdam, m order to reach agreement on the follos'rng issues:
(a) at rts orm irutiatrve, the WEU Council should provrde the EU from thc outset u'ith regular
secuntv assessments tn the arca of WEU's responstbrltttcs.
(b) onthe basis of WEU's expertrse, it should become a standrng practrce that decrsrons to be
taken bi the European Uruon rvrthin the mcanrng of Article J 7 of thc Treatl' of Amsterdam.
should be prepared from thc very beginntng b1'WEU.
(c) rn cases u'here the European Unron rs unablc to agree on avarling rtsclf of WEU rn elaboratrng
and rmplementlng a Petersberg mlssron, WEU should take tts oun dcctstons on the basrs of the
procedures set out rn WEU's Declaration of 22 Julf i997. includrng the optron of havrng
recourse to a frameuork natton.
8 AssrgnWEU personncl u'rthout delav to the policl,plannrng and carlr'\\arnlng untt to be sct up
b1'thc European Unron and establish legal and precrse cntena accordrng to nhrch WEU can provtde a
useful mput to the u'ork of that unit.
9 Examlne ln cooperatron n'ith the rclevant EU authontrcs, the possrbrhn of a WEU contrtbutton to
the "European Conference" proposed by' France, should thrs be decrdcd at the nert EU summit mcetmg.
I0 Rcgularly rnvrte thc Presrdent of the Assemblv to put thc vteu's of the Asscmbll'to the Councrl at
the operung of tts mtntstenal meettngs
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Exp lanatory M emoran d u m
(submitted by Mr Vrettos, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The signature of the Amsterdam Treaty,
modifying the Treaty on European Union con-
cluded in Maastricht, \\'as accompanied and fol-
lowed b1' numerous public comments all over
Europe but also in the United States, most of
u'hich expressed severe criticism of and disap-
pointment u'ith the poor results, as reflected in
the Treaty, achieved in the area of reform of the
European institutions m order to prepare them
for future enlargement. One particular criticism
was that Amsterdam failed to make substantial
progress on the objective of establishmg a com-
mon securit)' and defence policy in the frame-
u'ork of the European Union.
2. Holever, it is not the purpose of this re-
port to perpetuate this debate by denouncrng the
deficrencres of the Treaty nor to provide argu-
ments for all those Eurosccptrcs who ursh to
make public oprnion believe that Amsterdam was
another example demonstrating that the member
countnes of the European Union are nerther
rvilhng nor able to enter into political unron. Of
course. the Assembll, had submified realistic
proposals at the start of the mtergovernmental
conference But even though it is disappointrng
that these proposals \\,ere not follou'ed, this rs no
reason for resignation Such an approach rvould
be ven dangerous. As the whole process since
the end of the second world u'ar sholvs, the en-
deavour of realising the visron of European pol-
ttrcal union has been alu'a1,s a difficult and labor-
rous enterprrse rn rvhrch progress has been slou'
and setbacks frequent
3. But if the idea as a u'hole srmpll, fades
a\\'a\'. \\'e nsk a retum to the previous mould of
pohcres of hegemony,, the creation of spheres of
influence, the rebrrth of national competitron and
policres of a balance of porver. The results of
such pohcres are well known rn Europe It is our
responsibihh' to demonstrate our determrnatron
and convrctron that Europe u'lll succeed rn defin-
ing and reahsrng the oblective of political unron
and thus become an effective political player rn
the u'orld, m order to preserve peace and
strengthen rnternational secunty, as sct out ln
Artrcle J I of the Treaty of Amsterdam An
effectrve and expanding European Union is the
core around which the future unification of the
continent rvill takc place The European Union
has to have a central role m European security,,
befitting rts political and economic u'eight. In this
regard the revrsed Treatl' on European Unron 
-
and in particular Artrclc J I 
- 
could, rf the neces-
sary pohtical uill exrsts, pro!'e to be an impor-
tant step in the context of the shared values and
principles enshrined in the European Unron. cco-
nomrc development and social progress within a
peaceful and secure environment not onlv for the
EU member states but for the contrnent as a
u,hole.
4 Amsterdam is not the end of a process. On
the contran' rvork has to begin both to imple-
ment the provisions of the neu treatv and to drau,
the practrcal and political consequences of the
nelv srtuatron Thrs rs first and foremost a chal-
lenge for Western European Unron Secondly,
u'ork has to start rn order to revive the polrtical
impetus needed to allou, us to envlsage rn trme
taking further qualrtatrve steps in the directron of
European rntegration in those areas x,herc Am-
sterdam farled
5 In pursurng such an ob.;ectn,e rt is neces-
sary to proceed in a sprrrt of polrtrcal reahsm rn
order to avoid srtuatlons ansrng rn the future
similar to thosc rn u,hrch certaln ambitrous pro-
jects rvere rntroduced rnto the ncgotratrons rvrth-
out ensuring thev had a chance of berng accepted
by all the mcmbcr countncs conccrncd In thc
end. polrtrcal rmpetus rs alu.avs gcnerated bv
achtevrng practrcal progress through successful
joint action. It rvrll therefore bc crucral to u.ork
hard on enhancrng Europe's abrlrtv to orchcstratc
actlon and to agree raprdh' on a 
.;omt posrtion rn
any glvcn srtuatlon Thrs agarn rs a major chal-
lenge both for WEU and the European Unron
6 But rt should bc clear from the outsct that
a major condrtion for mcctrng thcse challenges is
carly ratrficatron of thc Treatv of Amsterdam. A
negatrve attrtude rn thrs rcspect rvould not hclp
On the contrary,. it u'ould producc a dangerous
sctback. Furthermorc. \\/EU has to redefinc rts
role and mlsslon The rmportance of the decrsions
facrng the WEU Councrl has been dcscnbed in
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the Assembly's preliminary assessment of the
situation rvhich led to Recommendation 618
being adopted by thc Standrng Commrttee on
16 October lgg7 t.
7. It is nccessary to recall that the redefi-
nitron of WEU's role and mission also has to be
considered rn the light of the neu, nature of its
relations u'ith NATO and of the Madnd deci-
srons takcn by thc Atlantic Alliance. Hou'ever,
WEU is not only a hnk or bridge betu'een the
European Union and NATO. It also has to drau'
thc consequences of thc fact that neither the
European Union nor the Atlantic Alhancc can be
said to be the organisations in rvhrch the Euro-
pean secuntl' and defence identitl, can be givcn
expression.
8. One of the results of Amsterdam is that on
the basrs of thc modrfied Brussels Trcaty', WEU
rcmains the onl1' framovork for cstablishrng thrs
European identrty because the European Unton is
not ),et prepared to takc on this functron and the
Atlantic Alliance rs not a purell, European or-
ganisation. The Amsterdam outcome makes it
necessary to clarif,' exactly what Europe's res-
ponsibilitres are rn thc field of securitl' and de-
fence Will the1, rn future be limited to non-Art-
rcle V mattcrs' ,Even though the threat to the
territorial rntegritl' of WEU member countries
seems to have disappeared for the time berng, the
question remalns u'ho rs responsible for the de-
fence of Europe todal' and rvho u'ill be respon-
srble for rt in the future)
9 Even though thc plans of some member
countnes to rntroduce the objectrve of the protec-
tron of territorral rntegntr- rnto the prearnble of
the Treatv of Amsterdam were not rcahscd, the
Treatl' confirms the oblective of safeguarding the
independencc and rntegritl' of the Europcan
Uruon At the samc trme, lt recognlses that a
number of the member states "see therr cofiurron
defcnce reahsed rn NATO, under the North At-
lantrc lreat\'-.
l0 n ,fr. brrefing it gave thc Presrdential
Committee on 17 Octobcr 1997 rn Bonn. the
Gcrman Charrmanshrp-rn-Office of the WEU
I Assembll'Documcnt 1581 on WEU's rolc in thc
organrsation of European sccurity after the decrsions
taken bt' the European Unron tn Amsterdam and by
NATO rn Madrid
2 Aruclc J 7 I of thc Treatl' of Amsterdanr
Council clearly stated that pure defence matters
should bc dealt u'rth b1' NATO on the basis of
Artrcle 5 of the Washington Treaty. On the other
hand, still according to the Presidency, WEU's
responsrbilitres should concentrate on crisis man-
agement as specrfied m the Petersberg Declara-
tion Ho$'ever, the text and scope of Article 5 of
the Washington Treatv rs not the same as that of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is
well knorur that the latter contains a much
stricter asslstance clause than the North Atlantic
Treatl'
I l. Howcver, one can observe a definite trend
among a numbcr of European goverffnents to
diminish the importance of Artrcle V of the
modified Brussels Treaty The question of tts
future application rs therefore on the table and
has to be studied carefully. It is evident that thrs
problem is not only a thcoretical one. It has far-
reaching conscquences for the nerv European
security architecture as a whole and m particular
for WEU's enlargement
12 During the second half of 1997 the ex-
change of vreu's and information between the
Assembly'and the Council and rts Presidencv rvas
particularly' close and intcnsive. Having been
briefed in June b1' Mr Ho1'er. German Mtntster
of State for Foreign Affairs, on the results of the
mtergovernmental conference and the programme
of the German Prcsrdencl' of WEU, the Presi-
dcntral, Political and Defence Commtttees had
meetings ri'ith the Permanent Council in Brussels
on 16 September 1997 and rvrth NATO expe(s
and NATO's Permanent Councrl on 17 Septem-
ber. A month later. on 17 October, Dr von
Ploetz, State Secrctary for Forergn Affarrs and
Dr Wrlz, Statc Sccretary for Defence of the Ger-
man Government, had an exchange of vleu's u'tth
the Presrdentral Commrttee in Bonn
13. For thc first trme for a number of ycars,
the first part of the 43rd amual report of the
Councrl to the Assembll' has arrived on timc,
thus allowing the Assembly' to study rt carefulll'
and repll' to it The Asscmbll' also apprecrates
that the Councrl has responded to some of tts
requests to transmtt a number of documents to tt
rn order to enhancc the information it has about
thc actrvrtres of thc Council. The rcinforccment
of riorking relatrons betwcen the Councrl and the
Assembll, on the basis of these improvcments
ri'ould be greatly' apprecratcd. An cnhanced dra-
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logue betu'een the Assembly' and the Council is
particularly ncdessary at a time rvhcn WEU is
faced rvith the challenge of takrng a number of
fundamental dccisions.
14. This need was clearly' demonstrated rvhen
the German Charrmanship-in-Offrce, represented
by the Forergn Mmister Klaus Kinkel and De-
fence Minister Volker Rrihe, rnformed the mem-
bers of the Presidential, Politrcal and Defence
Committees on 18 November 1997 of the out-
come of the WEU minrsterial meeting held in
Erfurt on 17 and 18 November 1997. lt is ob-
vious that the content of the Erfurt Declaration
issued by the WEU Council of Minrsters, which
mcludes substantial and positive elements for the
future rvork of WEU, needs to be carefully stud-
ied. This should be the sublect of a future report.
15. Horvever, the ansu'ers grven by' the Chair-
manship-in-Offrce to the vanous questrons put by
Assembly members during therr meetrng were
either drsappolnting or shou'ed that several of the
important problems outstanding are still far from
being settled The mmrstenal arguments rejecting
the proposals to hold a WEU summit and regu-
larlf invrte the Presrdent of the Assemblv to put
the latter's vieu's to the Councrl at the openrng of
its minrstenal meetings rvere far from convincing
Are some govemments afraid of being confronted
rvrth the Assembly"s arguments')
16 Thc Erfurt Declaratron does not provrde
anv real ans\\'ers to the marn questrons addressed
in the prcsent report, i.e. WEU's future respon-
srbrlities for European defence in the frameu'ork
of Artrcle V. the creatron of the ESDI and the
approprrate area of competence of the neu11'
creatcd Milrtary- Commrttee Furthermore. the
ven' modest steps envrsaged for reinforcrng co-
opcratlon x'rth the assoclate partner countrres are
very drsappolntrng rn vle\y of the consrderable
headuav made rn the NATO and European
Unron enlargement processes
II. The consequences ofthe Treaty of
Amsterdam for WEU's future role
1. Itlon-Article ll matters (crisis managenrent)
l7 Thcse matters rnclude all so-callcd Peters-
berg mrssrons In the relcvant WEU Dcclaratron
of l9 Junc 1992,thc Councrldecrdcd as follou's
WEU mcmber statcs dcclare that thel
prcparcd to make avarlable mrlrtan'
units from the rvhole spectrum of thcir
conventronal armed forces for military
tasks conducted under the authontt' of
WEU
Dccisions to use mrlitary units ansu'erable
to WEU uill be taken b-v- thc WEU
Councrl rn accordance rvith the provistons
of the United Nations Charter. Partrcipa-
tion m specrfic operations u'ill remain a
sovereign decrsion of member states in ac-
cordance wrth national constitutrons.
Apart from contributrng to the corrrmon
defence in accordance r,r'rth Article 5 of the
Washrngton Treatl' and Artrcle V of the
modrfied Brussels Treatl' respectrvelv,
militan' units of WEU membcr states,
acting under the authonty' of WEU, could
bc emploved for
humarutanan and rescue tasks.
- 
peacekceprng tasks,
- 
tasks of combat forccs in cnsls man-
agement. rncludrng peacemaking".
18. Mcmber countries of the European Union
agreed rn the Treatv of Amsterdam to grve the
European Unron competence to decrde rtsclf on
thc second categon' of these mrsslons I c non-
Artrcle V mrssrons Articlc J 7 (u'hrch s'ill be-
comc Artrcle l7 rn the consohdated verston of the
European Unron Treatv oncc lt has entered tnto
force) provrdes that questrons relatrng to the
securrt-v of thc European Unron "rnclude humant-
tanan and rescue tasks, peacekeeprng tasks and
tasks of combat forces rn cnsls management.
rncludrng peaccmakrng"
19 The Trcatv of Amsterdam does not horr'-
cver provide for the estabhshmcnt of propcr
Europcan Unron nlcans rn ordcr to carn out such
dccrsions. Accordrng to the decrsrons taken rn
Amsterdam
- 
the Europcan Unron u'rll ar arl rtsclf of
WEU to elaborate and rmplemcnt such
decrsrons and actrons of the Unron
u'hrch have defcnce rmphcatrons.
- 
WEU urll provtdc the European Unton
u,rth acccss to an operatronal capa-
brlrtr, notablv rn thc contc\t of Pctors-
bcrg mrssrons.are
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the competence of the European
Councrl to establish guidelines for thc
common foreign and secunty policy
(CFSP), rncluding for matters lvith
defence implications, will also obtain in
rospect of WEU for those matters for
u'hich the Union avails itself of WEU;
w'hen the European Union avails itself
of WEU to elaborate and implement
decrsrons of the Union on Petersberg
tasks, the Treaty provides.
(o) that all member states of the
European Unron rvill be entitled to par-
trcipate fully rn the tasks in question,
(b) for practical arrangements between
the European Union and WEU to allow
all member states of the European
Union contnbutrng to the tasks ln ques-
tion to participate full1' and on an equal
footing in planning and decision-taking
rn WEU.
20. These neu' provisions mean that WEU
must meet the challenge of qurckll, alterrng its re-
lations ri'ith the observer countnes (Austna,
Denmark, Frnland, Ireland, and Su'eden) At the
extraordrnan'ministerial mceting held on 22 July
1997 rn Brussels, WEU mcmber countries therc-
forc confirmed:
"that rvhen the European Uruon avarls it-
self of WEU to elaborate and rmplement
decrsrons of thc Union on the tasks re-
ferred to in Article J.7 2 of the Treatl, of
Amsterdam. all mcmber states of the
Unron shall be cntrtled to partrcrpate fulh'
rn the tasks in questron in accordance n'ith
Article J 7 3 of the Trcat,v of Amsterdam''
2l Furthcrmore, WEU minrsters agreed that
"WEU u'rll dcvelop the role of the observ-
ers rn WEU in hne u'rth provisions con-
tarned rn Artrcle J 7 3 and rvrll adopt thc
nccessary practical arrangements to allorv
all mcmber statcs of the European Union
contnbutrng to the tasks undertaken b1'
WEU at the rcqucst of thc European Unron
to partrcrpate full1'and on an equal footrng
rn plannrng and decrsron-takrng rn the
WEU'
The Assembll'has already pointcd out that
problcm of full partrcipatton of thc WEU
observer countries on an equal footrng rn WEU's
planning and decision-taking process in the
aforementioned area cannot bc resolved simpll'
by "practical arrangements"3. Article J.7.3 of the
Trcaty of Amsterdam has a number of funda-
mental legal, politrcal and mrlitary implications
rvhich rvill have to be based on sound intema-
tional agreements to be concluded befir'een the
WEU member countries and the countries con-
ccrned. They rvill have to be ratified by the rcle-
vant authorrtres of all the countrics involved.
This is partrcularlf in the rnterest of the WEU
observer countnes. The need for such a careful
procedure can be demonstrated among other
things b1' asking uhat u'rll happen rvhen a
Petersberg mission turns into an Article V srtua-
tion
23 By'virtue of the decrsrons taken in Rome m
November 1992 and at Kirchberg in 1994, the
WEU associate member countries, bv committing
forces to WEU mrlrtary opcrations. already have
the nght to pa(icrpatc on the same basis as fuIl
mcmbcrs rn these opcratlons and tn the relevant
excrclses and plannrng acttvttics
24 If the operatron is to be carried out u'ith
the support of NATO's operational assets. the
issue of the partrcipation of assoclate member
countries has also becn settled: as emerges from
the first part of the 43rd annual report of thc
Council to the Assembly', the Permanent Counctl
reached an agreement on 15 April 1997 on the
partrcipatron of European NATO Alhes in WEU
operatrons using NATO assets and capabilrties,
as s'ell as rn the plannrng and development of
such operatrons But there ts still a problem rvhcn
obscn'er countrles arc rnvolved So far, agroc-
ment has onlv been rcachcd on the tnvolvemcnt
of obsen,ers "to thc fullest cxtcnt posstble and rn
accordance u'rth therr status" rn the follow-up
urthin \\'EU to thc NATO Bcrhn and Brusscls
mrnrstcrral mcctlngs
25 Thrs means that rf obscrvcr countrtcs are
to have the nght to partrcrpate fullv and on an
equal footrng rn the plannrng and decrsion-takrng
process u'rthrn WEU rn cascs rn rvhrch WEU
uses NATO's opcratronal assets. furthcr agrec-
ment bctu'ccn WEU and NATO uill bc ncces-
san' In thrs conncctron the annual report of thc
Councrl rnforms thc Assemblv that Austria. Frn-
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land, Ireland and Srveden have submitted to the
Council a contributron on the participation of
non-allied observers in the defence-plannrng
process, and that this document has been for-
warded to NATO.
26. In the context of Petersberg missions
elaborated and implemented by WEU at the re-
quest of the European Union, rt is impossrble to
find any rndicatron in the annual report of the
Councrl of WEU's concept as to hou' to mvolve
the associate partner countries in these tasks. The
WEU Declaration of 22 July 1997 merell, an-
nounces at the very end that WEU rvill examine
how to strengthen the associate partners' particl-
pation in an increasing number of activities. But
this declaration of rntent has not been placed in
the context of Article J .7 .2 and 3 of the Treatv of
Amsterdam. In its programme of rvork the Ger-
man Presrdency said one of its arms was "to
involve the associate partners in WEU w'ork in
order to facrlitate their rnvolvement in WEU's
military cooperatlon and m WEU operatrons".
According to paragraph 28 of the Erfurt
Declaration
''Ministers approvcd the document on the
practrcal arrangements for particrpation of
assocrate partncrs in Petersberg opera-
trons, defining their rnvolvement rn the drf-
ferent phases of the crisis-management
process, rn partrcular u'ith rcgard to the
plannrng and force-generatron process "
Without knou'rng u'hat the content of that
document rs. rt rs rmpossrble for the Asscmblv to
take a positron on it
27 Hou'ever, all thcse statements shou'that at
the momcnt there arc no plans to change the
status of the assoclatc partner countncs rn WEU
The problem of WEU's future rclatrons rirth the
assocrate partner countries is exammed rn dctarl
m the report submrtted b1' Mr Martinez Casaii on
"the consequences of the Madrrd summrt for the
development of WEU's relatrons urth central and
eastern European countnes and Russra'{ But the
qucstron rs also stronglv hnked n,rth the futurc
relatronshrp betu'ecn WEU and the European
Unron and u'rth the latter's enlargcment pohc1,
Your Rapporteur u'ould therefore drau. partrcu-
lar attentron to paragraphs 2 (a) and (c) of Rec-
ommendation613 adopted on 16 October 1997
b1' the Standing Commrttee
28 WEU should take advantage of the as-
sessment madc in a document issued b1, thc
European Commrssron on 15 July' 1997 and en-
titled Agenda 2000 
- 
rn uhich the Commrssron
cxplicitll, states that all ten central European
candidates for membershrp of the European
Union (all of u,hich are also associate partncrs of
WEU, as u'cll as Cy,prus. u'hrch rs also an apph-
cant, fuIfil the condrtions for meeting therr obli-
gations under thc European Union's cornmon
foreign and sccunty polici' (CFSP) This evalua-
tron should be reason enough for WEU to grant
thc associate partner countnes full rights to par-
trcrpate in Petcrsberg mrssions requested by, the
European Unron and a maximum degree of par-
ticipation in WEU's plannrng and dccrsron-takrng
procedure m this area
29 In this connection the Assembll, rs satisfied
by'the informatron provrded bv the Councrl in rts
first part of rts annual report to the effect that
secunt), agreements har e in the mcantrme been
signed urth Poland, Bulgana, Slovakia and Lith-
uania It u'ould be useful to knorr uhcn WEU
u'ill completc the conclusron of such agrcements
urth all the assocrate partner countrrcs
30 It follous from the Dcclaratron of WEU
minrsters on 22 Julr 1997 and also from thc
bnefing grven bv thc German State Secretan, for
Defence, Dr Wrlz. on 17 October 1997, that
WEU rs prcpanng to rctarn rts capabrlrtv to take
tts oun dccrsions on Petersberg mlsslons on thc
basrs of the modrfied Brusscls Treatv and rts
Petersberg Declaratron This rntentron ls vcnr
much to bc n'elcomcd but the questlon rs u'hethcr
autonomous polrtrcal dccrsrons are strll reairstrc
alternatrves follou rng the rncolporatron of
Pctcrsbcrg tasks rn the Treatv of Amsterdam and
the cstabhshment of polrtrcal gurdehnes sct br.thc
European Councrl rn rcspect of \I/EU for thosc
matters for uhrch thc European Unron can avarl
rtself of WEU
3l In an artrcle on l-;tropean seutnlt' u/ier
Amsterdam pubhshcd on l-l August 1997, Mr
Gurdo Lcnzl Drrcctor of the \\'EU Instrtutc for
Sccuntl' Studtes, statcs hrs convlctlon that undcr
lts o\\n Treatv WEU rs cndorrcd x'rth an
indepcndcnt decrsron-makrng capabrlrtr'. but after
Maastncht and cvcn more so aftcr Amstcrdam,
thc polrtrcal mandatc could onh' coms from the
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European Union, rvrth WEU making preparations
for and assessing the feasibility of multrnational
forces, the composition of whrch will necessarill'
van according to the circumstances.
32 It seems that such an attitude rs norv wide-
spread u,ithin governments of member countries.
whereas the Sccretary-Gencral of WEU under-
hned on several occasrons and most reccntly rn
his address on 2 June 1997 to the Assembly that
his concern u'as "to ensure that WEU is ready to
undertake and carry out mrlitary operations that
may be decrded by the Council, either of its own
vohfion or at the request of the European
Union"
33. This statement was of course made before
the Treatl, of Amsterdam was concluded. It rs
therefore important to know soon hou'the WEU
Councrl rvrll implement its Declaration of
22 July 1997 This Declaration is drvided rnto
three parts Part A deals wrth the consequences
of the Treatv of Amsterdam for WEU's relations
with the European Uruon, part B deals u,rth rela-
trons betu'een WEU and NATO. and part C
addresses WEU's operational role in the dcvel-
opment of a European securrtl' and defence
rdentitl, (ESDI) As far as the questron of main-
tarnmg WEU's oun decision-makrng capabilrty
is concemed. eventhing depends on the interpre-
tation to be grven to thrs last part of the Declara-
tion
34 Earher on. rn part B, paragraph 10 of the
Declaratron, WEU ministers confirmed rn anv
event that
"In addrtron to lts support for the comrnon
defencc enshnned ln Artrcle 5 of the
Washrngton Treatl' and Artrclc V of the
modified Brussels Treatl'. WEU takes an
actrve role m conflrct prevcntion and cnsis
managcment as provided for in thc Peters-
berg Declaratron In this context, WEU
undertakes to perform rts rolc to the full.
Although thrs determrnation about WEU's role
rs cxpressed rn the context of rts futurc rclations
u,rth NATO. rt shou's clearly that WEU mrnrstcrs
consrder the modified Brussels Treatl, as u'cll as
thc Petersbcrg DcclaraUon to be the propcr basrs
for WEU's actn'rtrcs
35. In part C, paragraph 13, minrstcrs an-
nounced that
"WEU wrll develop its role as the Euro-
pean polrtrco-militarl'body for crisis man-
agement by using the assets and capabili-
ties made available by WEU nations on a
national or multtnational basis, and having
recourse- rvhen appropriate, to NATO's
assets and capabilities under arrangements
being worked out. In this context, WEU
rvill also support the United Nations and
OSCE in therr crisis-management tasks."
This part of the Declaration rs not related to the
question of WEU's future relations rvrth the
European Union
36. This rs demonstrated in particular by its
provlslons regarding future participation of
WEU's associate member and observer countries
in the Organisation's activities. At the end of
paragraph 14, WEU ministers firmli' declared
that.
''Wrth the aim of opening participation in
all its operations to associate members and
obsen'er states, WEU rvill also examme
tle necessan'modalrties to allou' associate
membcrs and observer states to participate
full1' rn accordance ri'rth therr status tn all
operations undcrtaken by WEU
WEU recalls that assoctate membcrs take
part on the same basts as full members rn
opcratlons to rvhrch they contnbute, as
rvell as rn relevant exerclses and planning
WEU urll also examtne the question of
partrcipation of the observers as full1, as
possrble rn accordance rvtth their status tn
plamrng and decrsion-takrng rirthrn WEU
rn all opcratrons to u'hich they contnbute.
WEU u'ili. rn consultatron u'hcre appro-
pnate srth the relevant bodres. examine
the possrbrlrtres for maxlmum partlclpatlon
in rts actrvrtres b1' assoclate mcmbcrs and
obscrver states m accordancc riith thcrr
status It u'rll addrcss tn parttcular acttvt-
tres in the fields of armaments. space and
mrlrtan'studres "
37 In thcsc paragraphs the Councrl repeats
three times that the partrcrpation of the relevant
countncs rvrll bc settled rn accordance u'tth the
slottts thel'havc rn WEU Horvever, rf WEU acts
at the rcqucst of the European Unton, the ob-
server countrles arc not subjcct to such a restrtc-
tron but arc entrtled. on the basis of the Treatv of
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Amsterdam, to partrcrpate fully and on an equal
footrng in WEU's planning and decision-taking
procedure.
38 These differentiations regarding the ob-
seryer countries would be unnecessary rf WEU
was not determined to retain its capacrty' to take
autonomous decisions in the area of crisis man-
agement. But rt rs obvious that the observer
countries ri'rll havc a major intcrest ln seeing to it
that almost all decrsions rn this area should ema-
nate from the European Union where they benefit
from full voting and decision rights Further-
more, this is in the major rnterest of the relevant
rnstitutions of the European Union as well, m
order to make full use of the incorporatron of the
Petersberg tasks mto the Trcat,v of Amsterdam
39 To avoid a situation in u,hich retaining the
rrght of WEU to take autonomous decisions re-
mains a dead letter rvrthout any polrtical signifi-
cancc, it is essential to reflect on the matter in
order to make the advantage of exercising that
option absolutely clear. This is a highly, polrtrcal
issue u'hich should be carefully prepared Noth-
rng should be done to create a sense of competr-
tron betrveen WEU and the Europcan Union On
the contran,. both organrsations should reach
agreement on the principle that, depcndmg on the
nature of each specrfic situatron, there could be
cases u'hrch should be handled by' WEU on rts
orrr and others rvhere WEU rvould act at the
request of the European Uruon But u'hereas the
Treatv of Amsterdam has clearl), glven the Euro-
pean Union competence in this area 
- 
and thrs is
evident rn the eves of pubhc opinion 
- 
it ls up to
WEU to carn' out the operatronal, milrtan, and
strategic aspccts. takrng rts orrn decrsrons on thc
basrs of lts o\\n Treatr ln a glven srtuation.
40 It rs therefore rvarmll to be u'elcomed that
accordrng to paragraph 5 of the Erfurt Declara-
tron
"Minrsters consrdcrcd that the moment has
no\\' come to reflect on procedures, s'lthrn
WEU, facilrtatrng conscnsus-burlding and.
u'here appropnate, the emergence of a de-
clslon to act rn rcsponsc to a specific cn-
srs, ruthin the framexork of the relevant
provrsrons of the modified Brussels
Treatr' "
4l Thus WEU and the European Union
should agree to share rcsponsrbrlrtrcs rn a spirrt
of cooperation simrlar to that ivhich rs about to
be developed bctrveen WEU and NATO. Bccause
of the political importance of this issue, it should
bc added to the list of rtems u'hich might be drs-
cussed at a WEU summit mecting, To take a
concretc example, WEU mrnisters have under-
lined WEU's readiness to support thc Unrted
Nations and the OSCE in their crisis-manage-
ment tasks. Docs that mean that WEU rvill
establish or mtensifi, drrect contacts srth these
organisations or lvrll it act via the European
Union or on the basis of a mandate the European
Union might receive or request from the Unrted
Nations or the OSCE? All these options should
rcmarn open but it is up to WEU to publicise rts
readiness and specr$'the scopc of the activities it
could undertake to support the aforcmentioned
orgarusatlons far more actrveh, than it has done
so far
42. Regarding the modtts operandr for the
implementation of Article 1.7 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. i e the procedure to be followed
u'hen thc European Union al,arls rtself of WEU
to elaborate and implement decrsrons and actrons
of the Unron u'hich have defence rmplicatrons,
the Assembll' rs grateful to the Councrl for
transmittrng to it a report of the European Unron
and WEU Presrdencies on mcetings betrveen
reprcsentatrves of both organrsations convened at
the rnitratrve of Francc and the Nctherlands'
43 Thcse contacts, u'hrch took place durrng
the first half of thrs vear, concentratcd on rela-
tions betu'een the European Uruon and WEU,
leavrng out cases rn u'hrch NATO assets arc
involved No formal conclusrons u'ere adoptcd.
But thc draft flou chart estabhshed on the basis
of thc "semrnars" that u'ere held demonstratc that
the procedure for coopcration betu'een WEU and
the European Unron rn rmplementrng Artrcle J 7
of the Trcatv of Amsterdam rvrll be cxtremelv
complicated It rs hou'ever to be uelcomed that
the tw'o organisations agreed that uhen a cnsls
srtuatron emcrges. a dccisron of the European
Unron based on thrs Artrcle rvrll be part of a
process rn u'hich WEU can help to prepare such
a decrsron
44. To that end thcr' also agreed that the WEU
Councrl mar', erther on its oun inrtratrve or at the
request of thc Europcan Unron. provrde the EU
l0
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wrth assessments as far as its oun area of re-
sponsrbrlity is concerned. Such a step rvill mcan
that any decision to be taken rvrll be based from
the outset on WEU's mrlitarl' expertise. It is
obvrous that consultations rvill norv be rcsumed
on thc basis of the provisions of the Treatl' of
Amstcrdam. In this connection it is imperative
for WEU institutions to bc involved from the
very begrnning of a given cnsls srtuation tn pre-
paring an1' European Unton decisions.
2. Thefuture application of Article V
45. As u'as stated rn the introduction. the rn-
creasing mfluence of those rvho are convinced
that Artrcle V of the modrfied Brussels Treaty is
no longer necessary in the present and future
mternational security situatron presents a real
danger A number of govemments were prepared
to reduce the mutual assrstance guarantce laid
doun in this Article to a voluntary non-binding
optron u'hich could be appended to an additional
protocol to the Treatl' of Amsterdam. But even
u'rthin the Atlantic Alltance, and m particular in
the United States, there is a grox'ing tendeno'to
bclieve that Europe, and in particular WEU,
should hmrt rts scope of actrvitv to areas of crisis
management and that the defence of Europe
should be left exclusivell' to the competence of
NATO Such an approach has been considerably
reinforced b1' the u,ordtng of subparagraph 3 of
Artrcle J 7 I of the Treatl'of Amsterdam
46 When bnefing the Presrdential Committee
on 17 October 1997 rn Bonn. the German
Charrmanshrp-rn-Office drd not mention Art-
rclc V of the modrfied Brussels Treatl' at all On
the other hand. a clear reference to that Article is
to be found in WEU's Declaration of 22 July
1997 In vieri' of thesc ambrgurties, lt ls tlmc to
studl' the questron of the future apphcatron of
thrs provrsion ri'hich rs the cornerstone of the
modrfied Brussels Trcatv and the only legal basrs
for a purell' European defencc. Is such a strtct
European mutual asslstance guarantcc strll
necessan'or does it on the contrary constttute an
obstacle to estabhshrng a European securitv ar-
chitccture')
41 . The questron has scveral drmcnsions. The
first rs the fact that there rs no longcr a mrlrtary
thrcat to the terntorial integritl' of WEU mcmber
countncs But thrs rs not a valtd reason for aban-
doning precautron in thrs respect for the future
The second potnt ts u'hethcr it is preferable for
Europe to rely exclusivcll' on NATO for pure
dcfence matters. This qucstron is closclv linkcd to
the vision of the final aim of European integra-
tron, the enlargement of the European institutrons
and the development of the transatlantic relation-
ship.
48. Has the intemattonal secuntl' situation
changed so radically' that the WEU Hague Plat-
form on European security' interests adopted on
27 October 19876 has become totally' obsolcte? It
should be remembered that in that document
WEU member governments agrecd on the follow-
ing:
"We recall the fundamental obligation of
Article V of the modfied Brussels Treatl'
to provrde all the milrtary and other aid
and asststance in our po\\'er in the event of
armed attack on an)' onc of us This
pledge. u'hich reflects our comrnon des-
trn\,, rernforces our commttments under the
Atlantic Alliance. to u'htch rve all belong,
and u'hrch we arc resolved to preservc.
Wc arc each detcrmtned to carry our share
of the corrrmon defence rn both the con-
ventional and nuclcar field in accordance
rvith the pnncrples of nsk- and burden-
shanng *'hrch are fundamental to alhcd
cohesron
- 
in the conventronal ficld. all of us rvill
contrnue to plar our part in the on-
gorng efforts to rmpror e our defcnccs,
- 
rn the nuclear ficld also. \\'e shall
contrnuc to carn our share. some of us
b1' pursurng appropnate cooperative
arrangements rrrtlt the Unrted States,
the Unrted Krngdom and Francc bv
contrnumg to marntain independent
nuclear forces. the credrbrlrtl' of rvhlch
thev arc dctennincd to prcscn'c
To this end ue shall
- 
ensure that our detcrmrnatton to defcnd
anv member countn' at tts borders ts
6 Asscmblv Documcnt I122
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made clearlv manifest by means of ap-
propriate arrangements. 
. .".
49. It is obvrous that the defcnce of Europe
has to bc considered in a new hght following the
disappearance of thc threat to the territorial rn-
tcgritv of member countries u'rth the end of East-
West confrontatlon The North Atlantic Council
drew the consequences of the neu. situation by
adopting a ne\\' strategic concept for the Atlantrc
Alliance on 7 and 8 November l99l in Romc.
But the Alhance has never called into question
the continurng importance of Article 5 of thc
Treaty of Washrngton
50 Western European Union, for its part, has
so far not vet succceded in estabhshing a clcar
security and defence conccpt u'hrch takes the neu,
srtuatlon into account. Nevertheless. srnce 1994,
the Councrl has embarked on a series of cfforts rn
order to define such a conccpt.
51. It should be remcmbered that WEU mem-
ber states dcclared for the first time rn
June 19927 that ther, \\'erc prepared to make
available mrlrtary unrts from the rvhole spectrum
of their conventlonal armed forces for mrlrtary
tasks conducted under the authontl' of WEU
(forccs ansxerablc to WEU 
- 
FAWEU) Thci.
also declared that thcse unrts u'ere to assume
other tasks intended to contnbute to thc corrunon
defencc in accordance urth Artrcle 5 of thc
Washrngton Trcatl and Artrcle V of the modrfied
Brussels Treatr- respectrvell
52 Houever the first srgn of a u,atenng-dosn
of the scope of thrs Artrclc appeared rn thc same
Declaratron u'hen WEU mlnlsters strcssed that
"the sccurrtt guarantees and defence
commrtments rn the treatres uhrch brnd the
member statcs urthin Wcstern European
Unron and u'hrch brnd them ri.rthin thc At-
lantrc Alhancc arc mutualll' rernforcrng
and u'rll not bc rnvokcd bi. thosc subscrrb-
rng to Part III of thc Petersberg Dcclara-
tion rn drsputes bctu'ccn mcmber statcs of
eithcr of thc tu'o organlsatlons "
Although one can understand that therc rrerc
specrfic rcasons for thrs sort of clanficatron. rt
constrtutcs a dangerous proccdent for a procedurc
rn u'hich the tntcrprctatron of a fundamental
provrsion ofan internatronal treaty is altercd by a
simplc dcclaration without parhamentary ratrfi-
cation In your Rapporteur's vierv, rf a WEU
member state rs the object of an armed attack in
Europe, Artrcle V of the modified Brussels
Treatl' should bc fully applied rvirhour its apph-
catron berng restricted by ministerial or other
declaratrons.
53. Regardrng thc formulatron of a nerv Euro-
pean sccurity, and dcfence concept rn u,hich the
futurc role of Artrcle V should also be addressed,
the Council's rvork started with Prehmtnary
conclusrons on the formulafion of a common
European defence policy published on l8 Nov-
ember 1994 in Noordrvryk8. It u'as follorn,ed by a
Common re.flecfion on the new European sec-
unQ condrtrons presented to WEU mnisters on
15 Ma1' 1995 in Lrsbon This led to a document
on European securtry', a common concept of thc
27 WEU countnes. adopted bv the WEU Coun-
crl of Mrnisters rn Madrid on 14 November
I 995e.
54 All thcse documents contain clcar com-
mitments bl' WEU member countnes to the
Haguc Platform and to European responsibrlrtres
regardrng collectrve dcfencc The follourng quo-
tatlons prove rt
"A common European defcnce policl'
should takc as its basrc assumptron the
collcctive coopcratn,e approach to defcncc.
as estabhshed rn collectrve defence alh-
ances under thc Brussels and Washrngton
Treatrcs
"\\'EU got,ernments have a drrect respon-
srbrlitv for thc securitv and dcfence oftherr
oun pcoples and tcrrrtoncs" (paragraph
-1 of thc Prclimrnan, conclusrons on thc
fonnulatron of a common European dcf-
cnce poho')
,5-5 Thc common WEU posrtrons \\.ere re-
sumcd rn paragraph 158 of thc document on
litropean secunl)) A common concept of the 27
IVEU countrre.r on l4 Norcmbcr 1995
"Thc Prehmlnan' concluslons on thc for-
mulation of a common Europcan defcncc
poho' . *hrch takc up the languagc of
See the Petcrsbcrg Dcclaratron.
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the Haguc Platform and the nerv strategic
concept of the Alliance whrch were agreed
respectively by WEU in 1987 and NATO
rn 1991. underline that "Europeans have a
major rcsponsibilitv rvith regard to defence
in both the conventional and the nuclear
fields" (it should be noted that on that oc-
caslon Austria, Fmland, Ireland and Su'e-
dcn recalled they w'ere not partl' to these
decisions). The documcnt continues: "The
independent nuclear forces of the United
Kingdom and France. rvhich havc a deter-
rent role of their olw, contrrbute to the
overall detcrrence and sccuritv of the Al-
lies."
56. Both the aforementioned documents recall
parts of the Petersberg Declaration uhich refer
explicitll' to the contribution of mrlrtary units
made available to WEU for the conrmon defence
in accordance with both Article 5 of thc Wash-
ington Treatl' and Article V of the modified
Brussels Treatl' Bearing in mrnd that the Decla-
ratron of WEU adopted on 22 July 1997i0 agarn
refers to WEU's support for the comnlon defence
enshrined rn thrs Article, there mrght be a case
for askrng u-hether there rs an)' rcason to be x'or-
ned about the future apphcatron of thrs comcr-
stone of the modified Brussels Treatl' Hou'cver,
in vour Rapporteur's vlew. there ts
57 There arc several schools ofthought rn this
connectron. Thc first is defended by' those who
arc convinced that too strong an emphasts on
Article V of the modified Brussels Treatl, as the
basis of an indepcndent European defence u'ill
affect transatlantrc solidantv and couid lead to a
Iesscning of the commitment to the defencc of
Europe bi'the Unrted States, ri'hrch has guaran-
teed European securltv srncc 1945 Hotr-ever. as
Iong as all thc srgnatorres of the modrfied Brus-
sels Treatl' are at the samc trmc srgnatortes of the
Washrngton Trcatr', full apphcatron of Article V
can onlv rernforce Europcan commitrnents undcr
the Atlantrc Alhance as \\'as undcrhned in the
Haguc Platform Such rernforccmcnt should rn
fact be vcrv much rn the rntercst of our North
Amerrcan alhes x'ho are constantlv askrng Euro-
peans to enhance thcir defence efforts.
58 Hou'evcr. a second school of thought con-
cerns the final objectrvc of the mternal develop-
mcnt of the European Union and its enlargement
as ri'ell as the enlargement of WEU. It is hnked
rvrth the problem of hou' to achieve a corrrmon
sccuritl,and defence identity' in the frames'ork of
the European Union urth a vrew to the possibilitl'
of WEU's integration into the Uruon These rvere
the most controvcrsial qucstions up to the vcn'
end of the intergovernmental conferencc It is
obvious that it s'ould be much easier for the four
member countries of the European Union rvith
neutral tradrtions to corunlt themselves unreserv-
edh, to such a European rdcntrty' if it u'cre limited
to crisis-prevention and crisis-management tasks
u,ithin the meanrng of the Petersberg Declaration.
Limrting European secunt)' responsibilities tn
this u'a1, u'ould also facilitate enlargement to-
rvards central Europc Even tn somc countries
strongly' in favour of full integration of WEU into
thc European Uruon at an earll' stage, the prob-
lcm this u'ould creatc for European Unron en-
Iargcment ri'as full1' recogntsed but not debatcd rn
pubhc. Hou-evcr. it rras reflected in the plan
presented b1' srx member countries to the intcr-
governmental confcrence proposlng to mtegrate
WEU in the Europcan Unton in thrce phascs.
rvrth the provrso that the dcfcncc commitment
rtsclf could possrblv bccome a voluntary optton
59. Even though the final phase of this plan
was not adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam,
the question remains open. It also has an
important transatlantic dimension. There is a
widespread view in the United States that the
best guarantee of the independence and
territorial integrity of the new democracies in
central Europe is their early integration into the
European Union. But on the other hand. the
United States made clear from the very
beginning that it would be strongly opposed to
enlargement of the relevant European
organisations towards central Europe if this led
to "backdoor" comrhitments by the United
States regarding security guarantees for those
central European countries it was not ready to
admit to the Atlantic Alliance.
60 In vrclr of the closc tres bctq,ccn NATO
and WEU. such "backdoor corrunrtmcnts could
in fact arisc rf thc Europcan Unron. complc-
mented bv WEL-I's fuIl defcncc drmensron. werc
to rnvrtc ccntral European countrics unablc to
bccomc NATO membcrs to 
.;otn the Europcan
Union Thrs u.as ouc of the reasons rvhl' thc
United States rras not rn favour of thc full rntc-
gratlon of WEU rnto thc Europcan Unton1o Assembll' Documcnt 1582
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6l Thc situation created bi' the Amsterdam
decision to postponc a decrsron on establishing a
common defence rvrthin the European Union and
on the integration of WEU rnto the European
Union means that the tssue of granting Europcan
securitl guarantees to neu,mcmber countries has
norv become less toprcal for the European Unron.
But rt ivrll bccome a ma1or problem for WEU if
rt seriousll' rntends to cnhancc rts relatronshrp
ivith the associate partner countnes in a substan-
tral rvav The question of separatrng the securitl,
guarantees laid do*n rn the Washmgton Treaty,
from those of the modrfied Brussels Treaty is on
the tablelr rvhether one likes it or not and r,r'ill
manrfest itself in practrcal terms once the Euro-
pcan Union decides to rnvrtc Estonia and Slove-
nia to become members. as thc European Com-
mission has proposed So far nerther country has
bcen rnvrted to loin the Atlantic Alliance Hori-
cver. according to Declaratron II adopted bv
WEU member countrres rn Deccmber l99l in
Maastrrcht "states x'hrch arc members of the
European Unron are invited to accede to WEU on
condrtions to bc agreed rn accordance rvrth Art-
rcle XI of the modrfied Brussels Treaty (or to
become observcrs rf thel' so rvish)" Conse-
quenth'. Estonia and Slovenia could ask for full
membcrship of WEU once thev accedc to the
European Union
62 Hou'urll WEU respond to such requests?
The question rs not hrpothctrcal Sel,eral scenar-
ios are rmagrnable WEU could react by empha-
srsrng that one of the ''condrtrons to be agreed" rs
mcmbership of NATO. An altematn,e could be
to rnl,rte the countnes concemcd to conclude a
specral agreement u rth WEU undcr rvhich thev
rvould benefit from all thc provrsrons of the
modrfied Brussels Treatl, u'ith thc cxceptron of
the secuntt' guarantee contarned rn Artrcle V It
could be agreed that Article V ri'ould be apph-
cable to the countncs conccrned once thcl' had
jorned the Atlantrc Aihancc In addrtron. WEU
could commrt rtsclf to strong support for thcrr
apphcatron to lorn NATO
63 A thrrd optlon mrght consrst rn invrting
thesc countrres to accede u'ithout rcscn'atton to
rr Scc for lnstance Karl Kaiscr n T'he Europcan
securttt' space. Dccember 1996, rn thrch he savs
"Membershrp of a rer-rtahsed WEU rvrthout NATO
mcmbershrp ts now an at'arlable opuon that makes
mrlrtan and polrtrcal sensc"
the modrficd Brusscls Trcatl,. includrng Ar-
trcle V, u'hether or not th*, are admitted to
NATO. Thrs u,ould mcan a separation between
thc sccurrtv guarantecs contarned in the modified
Brussels Treatl and those provrded in the
Washrngton Treaty and u,ould necessitate lmpor-
tant changes rn the relatronship betu,cen WEU
and NATO It rs obvrous at present that such a
neu' pohcv u'ould have no chance of berng ac-
cepted by WEU member countnes
64. On thc other hand. it x'ould appear that no
ma.;or oblectrons u'ould be forthcoming from the
Russian srde And n'hat about the United States?
It is rtself about to conclude a secuntv chartcr
ri'ith the Baltrc states outside the frameu'ork of
NATO. Such a charter u'ould surely not contap
a securitv guarantee rn thc true scnse. But real or
lmagman' American oblectrons to the develop-
ment of purelv Europcan secuntl' guarantees can
no longer bc a reason for this subject to be taboo
In no u'av u'ould such a development rcnder thc
Washington Treatl suporfl uous
65 Thrs subjcct gocs far bel,ond thc problcm
of cnlargcmcnt It gocs to the very. heart of the
crcatlon of a Europcan secuntv and defencc
identrtv and r,rsrons of thc role and place of
Europe rn the u'orld Europe has to decrde
rvhethcr rt rs dctermrned to havc a true defcnce
rdentrtv or x'hether thrs rdentrty is to be hmrted.
rvith the core of European defence remamrng the
responsrbilrtl' of the Unrtcd States as the leading
countr)' rn NATO Thrs has to be drscussed not
onlv among Europeans but also u,rth thc Unrted
States and Canada It emergcs from the first part
of the 43rd arurual report of the Councrl to the
Asscmblv that the Frcnch WEU Presidencv con-
trnued the process of reflectron 
- 
at 28 
- 
on the
themc of European secuntv lnterests on the cve
ofthc 2lst ccntun
66 It urll bc necessan' to complcte thrs pro-
ccss. rvhrch among othcr thrngs should produce
firm concluslons or thc futurc of Artrcle V of the
modrfied Brusscls Treatv rn the Ight of the neu'
European and uorldu'rdc sccurrtv envrronment
Thrs mrght lcad to thc formulatron of a rn'rscd
versron of thc Haguc Platform and should also
feature on the hst of rtcms that mrght bc put on
the agenda of a WEU summrt mectrng In thrs
contcxt rt mrght be an cncouraging srgn that for
thc first trme sincc the pubhcatron of thc Haguc
Platform. WEU mrnrsters agreed rn paragraph 53
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of the Erfurt Declaratton that "although politrcal
circumstanccs have dramaticalll' changed since
the signaturc [of the modified Brussels Treatl'] it
continues to form a valuable part of the Euro-
pean security' archttccture "
3. The European securitt and defence identity
67 As uas argued in the report presentod bv
Mr Blaauu' on ''WEU's role in thc organisatton
of European security' after thc decisions taken by
the European Unton in Amsterdam and by'
NATO in Madrid"l2, thc estabhshment of a
European secunty and defonce identitl' (ESDI)
cannot be limrted to a purely' internal structural
adaptation process rvtthtn NATO It rs a hrghll'
political issue m ri'hich WEU, the Europcan
Union and NATO are mvolved. Whereas consid-
erable progress has bcen made x'ith the drstribu-
tion of tasks betu'een WEU and NATO and the
krnd of cooperatlon there should be betu'een
these tu'o organtsattons. the brrefing thc Polrtical
Committee recetved from the relcvant cxperts at
NATO headquartcrs on l7 September 1997
shori'ed that much remalns to be donc Thts con-
cerns. for lnstance- the coordinatton of dcfence
plannrng and the concluston of command ar-
rangements and secuntv agreements bctu'ccn
WEU and NATO. takrng into account the fact
that rn most cascs \\'EU acts at l8 or 28. u'rth
the partrcrpatron of non-NATO member coun-
trics
68 Last but not least. thc CJTF problcm rs
strll not defintttvelv scttlcd But a ma;or polrtical
probicm ts hou'to brrng the ESDI tnto ltnc urth
the common forcrgn and securttv pohcl' (CFSP)
to be developed rn the European Union. llhtch
rncludes a number of countnes that are not rcadl'
to 
.;orn mrlrtan alltanccs Thrs ritll bc a ma;or
challenge for WEU tn the context of devcloprng
rts future relatrons utth thc Europcan Union In
vrcu of thc confimratron bv the Trcatl' of Am-
sterdam of WEU's rolc as an tntegral part of thc
dcvelopment of tho Europcan Unton and bearrng
rn mrnd the far-rcachrng ob.lectnes defined for
the EU's comrnon forcrgn and securth' poltcr tn
Article J I of thc J'rcatr'- WEU has to contrtbutc
to the elaboratton of thc dcfcncc aspccts of the
CFSP takrng lnto account thc u'av rn tvhrch the
European Unton secs 1ts o\\n future rolc ln the
u'orld In addrtton. WEU rvrll havc thc tmportant
responsrbrlity of influencing the Union's opinion-
forming process, rn particular in all areas uhtch
ma1, have defence tmplicatrons.
69. In this context rt is u'orth noting hou' thc
European Commtsston cvaluates the role of the
European Unton rn the u'orld n fis Agenda 2000
documcnt published on I5 Jull'1997 According
to the Commission. thc European Unton "must
increase tts tnfluence in *'orld affairs, promotc
values such as peace and securlt)' . .''
70 The Commisston underltncs the lmpor-
tancc of maintaining thc terntorial mtegrtt)' of the
European Uruon. Furthermore, it points out that:
"Through its mtcmattonal tmplicattons,
enlargement u'tll have an tmpact far be-
1'ond the neu' frontters of an cnlarged
Europe bccausc rt ri'ill increase Europe's
u'erght in the u'orld. grvc Europe ne\\'
netghbours and form Europe into an area
of unitv and stabihtv
An enlarged Unton urll have more dlrect
frontters urth Russta as u'ell as frontiers
uith Ukrarnc. Belarus and Moldova It
urll en;o1' dtrect acccss to the Black Sca
rvhrch urli lead to intensrfied contacts rvtth
thc countrtes of thc Caucasus and central
Asra An cnlargcd Unton rltll also sur-
round the Kahntngrad oblast. nhrch is part
of Russta. and uill contaln sevcral hun-
dred thousand cthntc Russtans. lrvrng
matnlv tn Estonta and Latvra It u'rll be
tmportant for the enlarged Unton to deepcn
tts relattonshrp ri'rth Russla. Lkrarne and
the othcr NIS on the basts of thc Partner-
shrp and Coopcratron Agrccments (PCAs)
An-rong the Unton's nc\\' ne rghbourrng
countrtes urll bc thosc of the Balkan rc-
gron Stabrlrtr through cooperatlon tn thts
regron urll bc all the more important for
thc cnlargcd Unron "
11 The Europcan Commtsston underltncs thc
lmportancc of '-maktng the European Unton a
global actor" and strcsscs among othcr thrngs
that
"The Europcart Union u t11 tncrcastngll'
have to acqurrc the capacrtv to take forcign
pohcv dectstons int olr'tng the usc of mrlt-
tary rcsources Thrs ts cssentlal rf the
Unton's cxternal actlon IS to be credrblc It
uill thcrcforc bc ncccssan' to strcngthcnrr Assembll' Document I58l
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thc operational resources of the WEU,
both in order to carry out the nerv tasks
laid doun in the Treaty of Amsterdam and
u,rth a vierv to the WEU becoming increas-
ingl1, integrated in the development of the
European Union itself. "
72. On the basrs of the prelimrnary work done
b1'WEU at 28 on the subject of European secu-
rr$ interests on the eve of the 2lst centur1,, WEU
non' has thc task of elaboratrng and adopting a
comrnon security and defence concept which
takes into account the neu' situation created by
thc Amsterdam and Madrid decisions. The ob-
jectrve of such a concept should be to establish
WEU as the hard core of a true European secu-
rrty and defence rdentrty from rvhich the neccs-
sary polrtical impetus rvill emanate for decisions
to be taken b1, WEU rtself or by the European
Union or NATO in any given situatron affecting
the securrty of Europe. This might lead to a new
versron of the Hague Platform.
III. A w,orking programme for llEU
73. Regardrng the substance of the concept,
the follorving points are among those that should
bc addressed
- 
the cstabhshment of cntcrra in the area
of non-Artrcle V matters u'hich should
preferabll, be settled on the basis of
autonomous decrsrons and actrons
taken b1'WEU as provrded in WEU's
Declaratron of 22 Jul1, 1997 and in its
Erfurt Declaration of 18 November
1997 
.
- 
thc estabhshment of a sound legal basis
for the partrcrpatron of observer coun-
tnes in WEU's actir,,rties both on the
basrs of an autonomous dccrsron-taking
capabrlrtl' and at thc request of thc
European Unron.
- 
a conccpt for the future tmplemcntatron
of Artrcle V of the modrficd Brussels
Trcatf in rclatron to both the futurc
development of the Europcan Union
and WEU's functron as an intcgral part
of EU developmcnt. as u'ell as in rcl-
atron to the defence commrtments ans-
ing out of Artrcle 5 of the Washington
Treatl' and in connectlon urth the
future enlargement of the Euroatlantrc
securitl, organlsahon to thc cast and
south,
- 
the estabhshment of a clear position on
the question of u'hcther the tasks of the
nervly created WEU Mrlrtary Com-
mittee arc to tnclude Article V issues,
as rs the case for forces ansu'erable to
WEU (FAWEU). It should bc noted in
thrs context that according to para-
graph 30 of the Erfurt Declaratron,
Mrnisters "noted that the respons-
ibrlities of the mrlitary commrttee as
regards WEU's contribution to NATO
defence plannrng u,ill have to be clar-
rficd'' The qucstron of these responsl-
brlrtics urll include Article V rssues left
unans\\'ercd in the mcetlng with thc
Chairmanship-in-Office on l8 Novem-
ber 1997,
- 
the problem of u,hether certarn pro-
.r.'lsions of the modified Brussels Treatl,
need to be revised or ad.lusted As an
examplc. one should note that rn vlew
of thc creatron of WEU's Mrlrtary.
Commiftec and the estabhshment of
WEU mrlrtary structures and FAWEU,
therc is a need to amend thc second
paragraph of Artrcle IV of the modrfied
Brussels Treatv n'hrch currcntlv reads
as follorvs
"Rccognrsrng the undesrrabrlrt] of
duphcatrng the mrlrtan' staffs of
NATO. thc Councrl and rts Ageno,u'rll
rclr on the appropnate mrlrtan'
authontrcs of NATO for rnformatron
and advrce on mrlrtan.mattcrs ''
74 Rcgardrng futurc relatrons u'rth the Euro-
pean Unron. thc l5 EU member countncs agreed.
rn thc Protocol appended to Article J 7 of the
Treatv of Anstcrdam. that the Europcan Unron
u'rll drau' up. togethcr s'ith Westcrn European
Unron, arrangemcnts for enhanced coopcratron
betuecn thcm. rvrthrn a \ear from the entn. rnto
force of thc Protocol Houever. rt u.ill not bc
possrble to u'art untrl thc u'hole ratrficatron pro-
cess has becn completed Negotiations betu.ecn
thc tu'o organrsations arc to begrn nou' and srll
have to scttle a largc number of tssucs gorng
bevond thc problcnr of cnsrs managemcnt
l6
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75. It should be noted rn this context that thc
preamble to this Protocol, apart from recalling
the provrsrons of Article J.7.1 and 3 of the Treaty
of Amsterdam, refers explicrtly to thc part of the
Treatl' rvhich specrfies that thc pohcy' of the
Europcan Union "shall ... respect the obligations
of ccrtain member states, w'hich see thetr com-
mon dcfence realised in NATO".
76. ln addition to the programme of enhanced
cooperation betu,een WEU and the European
Union contamed ln WEU's Declaration of
22 July 1997, WEU and the European Union
should drscuss the following items as a matter of
urgenc)'
- 
the consequences for practical coop-
eration betrvecn both organisattons of
the decision taken by'the WEU Councrl
on l7 Septembcr 1997 on a new se-
quence of presidencies in order to
harmoruse the WEU and the European
Union sequence of presrdencies as
much as possrble;
- 
WEU's input to thc pohcl' planning
and early, \\'arnlng untt to be established
bv the European Union under the
responsrbrlrty' of its Sccretary'-Gcneral:
thc decrston that WEU should provide
appropnate personnel for thrs unit
should be rmplemented as soon as
possible In paragraph 16 of thc Erfurt
Declaration, Mrnisters undcrhned "that
close dat'to-dav coopcratton betr,veen
the WEU and the European Union inter
olta depends on a rapprochement of the
drfferent u'orking cultures of both Or-
ganisations" This statement is of part-
rcular importance and it rvtll 'bc nec-
essal],to find out s,hat rs really' meant
bv rt.
- 
given WEU's enhanced responstbtltttes
to provtde the European Unton urth
acce ss to an opcrattonal capabrlrtr'.
support rt ln framing thc defcnce
aspccts of thc CFSP and claboratc and
rmplement dcctsions and actions of the
European Unton u'hich havc defencc
rmphcatrons. rt rvould make scnse for
the latter to makc a substanttal
contrrbution to WEU's budget,
cspecially for Pctersbcrg mrssions.
the question of WEU's possible con-
tnbution to thc "Europcan Conference"
proposed by' France, should this be
decrded at the next EuroPean Union
summlt meeting, could be drscussed
rvith the relcvant European Union auth-
ontics,
77 Regarding WEU's ortn development, it
should be remcmbered that the document on
litropean secunty: a common concept of the 27
WEU countnes adopted by'the WEU Council of
Minrsters on 14 Novcmber 1995 rn Madrid iden-
tified the follou'tng gaps and deficiencies ln
Europe's operational capabilrtrcs:
"There arc several areas, rvhere gaps and
deficrencies can clearh' be rdentified:
- 
reconnalssance and tntelhgence,
strategic and in-theatre transport cap-
abrlrtrcs.
standardisatton and interoperabilrty.
the European defencc rndustrial base "
78 In his address to the Asscmblv on 2 June
1997, Mr Cutilerro. Secretary'-General of WEU,
confirmed that "thanks to the efforts of
successlve presidenctes over the past ferv y'ears,
WEU rs norv read1, to undertake Petersberg
tasks. The instrument extsts'' But at the samc
time he underlined that European mrlrtary' cap-
abrlrtres \\'erc so limrted that WEU u'ould only'be
capable of undertakrng milrtary operattons of a
certarn magnttude rf rt could rch' on NATO as-
scts and capabrlrttes Lorr spcndrng an Europcan
defence rn comparison urth u'hat the Unrted
States spent drd not make rt possrble to filI Euro-
pcan gaps in the arcas of command. control,
communicatrons. intelhgcnce. strategrc mobilitl'
and rnteropcrabtlrtr'. thus tn ncarlv all the areas
mentroned t$'o vears ago m thc aforementtoned
WEU document Thc problem of enhancing
WEU's operattonal capabilrtres thcrcfore remalns
on the agcnda Thrs also apphcs to the need for a
sohd legal basts to undcrprn WEU's efforts to
cstabhsh a corrunon armaments poltcl' urth thc
hclp of WEAO and tts uork to create a European
armaments agcnc)' These actrvttres requirc sub-
stantrallv tncreased financial contrtbuttons from
WEU mcmbcrs. assoclatc membcr and assoctatc
partner countries
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IV. Conclusions
79 The decrsrons that lvere taken, or not
taken, by the European Union in Amsterdam and
b1' the Atlantic Alliance in Madrid have led to a
situatron that gives rise to serious doubts as to
u,hether the prolect of a common European de-
fcnce is strll a real politrcal objective berng pur-
sued bi'all governments of the relevant European
countrics. Whereas it would seem that thc Atlan-
tic Alhance and NATO have succeeded in adlust-
ing more effrcientlv to thc ne$' international
security' situation, one has the impression that
Europeans are still lagging behind
80 Thrs impression has been greatll. rein-
forced b1, the farlure of Amsterdam to make
substantral progress rn establishing a European
secunt),and dcfcnce rdcntity m thc frameu'ork of
the European Union Whereas cooperation be-
tu,een WEU and NATO has made considerable
progress (desprte the outstandrng questions and
shortcomrngs), solutions to the main polrtrcal
problems that remain must be sought m Europc
itself, in partrcular by defining WEU's future
role rn its relatrons rvith the European Union.
8 L This report has therefore concentrated on
studying first and foremost the outstandrng
securitl, issues u'hrch rnvolve WEU and the
European Union Havrng descnbcd the main
problcms rn Chapter II and proposed a pro-
grarnme of u'ork for WEU in Chapter III of this
report, 1,our Rapporteur shares the opinion ex-
pressed by thc Presrdcnt of the Assembly,. as u,ell
as b1'the Standing Commrttee rn Recommenda-
tion 618, that most of the matters drscussed are
of such an important polrtrcal nature that they'
nced to be addressed at the hrghest polrtical level
It rs true that the solutrons must be carefullv
preparcd, but tho,u'rll onlv recel\,e the necessary,
pubhc support rf the relel'ant dccrsrons are taken
collectivelv and rn pubhc and are explained bv
the highest polrtrcal authorrtres
ln
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APPENDIX I
Article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam
The common forcign and security pohcy shall include all questrons relating to the securrtl' of the
Unron, rncluding the progressrvc framing of a common defence policl'. in accordance rvrth the
sccond subparagraph, rvhrch mrght lcad to a common defencc, should the European Council so
decrde It shall in that case recomrnend to the Member States thc adoption of such a dccrston m
accordance rvith therr respcctive constituttonal requirements
The Western Europcan Union (WEU) rs an intcgral part of the dcvelopment of the Union provid-
ing the Union u,ith access to an operational capability notably in thc contexl of paragraph 2 It
supports the Unron m frammg the defence aspects of the common foretgn and secunt,v pohcv as
set out in this Artrcle. The Union shall accordrngly foster closcr institutional relations ruth the
WEU rvith a vierv to the possibrlity' of the rntegration of the WEU into the Uruon, should the
Europcan Councrl so decrde It shall in that case rccorrrmcnd to the Member States the adoption
of such a decrslon rn accordance u'ith therr respective constitutronal requirements
The pohcy' of the Unron rn accordancc rvrth this Article shall not preludice the specrfic character
of the sccurity' and defencc policl, of certarn Member States and shall respect the obhgatrons of
certain Member States, u,hich see therr common defence reahsed in the North Atlantrc Treatv Or-
ganrsatron NATO), undcr the North Atlantic Treatl' and be compatrble u'rth the colrlmon sccu-
ntv and defcnce policy' estabhshed u,ithtn that framex'ork.
The progressrve framing of a common defence pohcy' rull bc supported. as Member States con-
srder approprrate. b1' cooperation betrvcen them rn the ficld of armamcnts
Questions referrcd to in thrs Artrcle shall include humanrtarran and rescue tasks. peacekeeping
tasks and tasks of combat forces ln crlsls managcment, rncludrng pcacemaking
Thc Unron urll avarl itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement dcctstons and acttons of the
Unron uhrch have defcnce impltcattons
Thc competcnce of the European Council to cstablish gutdeltnes tn accordance rvtth Article J 3
shall also obtarn in rcspect of the WEU for those matters for ri'hrch the Unron avarls rtself of thc
WEU
Whcn the Unron avails itsclf of the WEU to elaborate and rmplement decisions of the Unton on
thc tasks referred to ln paragraph 2 all Member Statcs of the Unron shall be entrtlcd to partlclpate
fullv rn the tasks rn qucstron The Councrl, rn agrcemcnt u'tth the rnstrtuttons of the WEU, shall
adopt tire nccessan practrcal arrangements to allou' all Member States contnbutrng to the tasks
ln qucstton to partrcrpatc fullv and on an equal footrng rn planntng and decrston-takrng rn the
WEU
Decrsrons havrng dcfcnce rmphcatrons dealt u'rth under thrs paragraph shall be taken u'rthout
prejudrcc to thc pohcrcs and obhgatrons rcfcrrcd to in paragraph l. thrrd subparagraph
Thc provrsrons of thrs Artrclc shall not prevent the der,'eloprncnt of closer coopcratton betuecn
t\\'o or more Mcmbcr States on a brlateral ln'el. rn the framcn'ork of the \\IEU and the Atlantrc
Alhance. provrded such coopcratron does not run counter to or tmpcde that provrded for tn thts
Trtle
Wrth a vr*r' to furthcrrng thc oblcctrvcs of thrs Artrclc. thc provrsrons of thrs Artrcle rvrll bc rc-
r,'rcued rn accordance urth Artrclc N "
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APPENDIX II
Protocol to Article J.7 of the Treat.,1, of Amsterdam
..THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES.
BEARING IN MIND the necd to rmplcment fullv thc provlsrons of Artrclc J 7 (1). second
subparagraph. and (3) of thc Trcatv on European Uruon.
BEARING N MIND that thc pohcy'of the Uruon rn accordancc urth Artrcle J 7 shall not prc3udrce thc
specific charactcr of the sccuntv and defcno: policl'of ccrtarn Nlcmbcr Strtcs and shall respect thc obligatrons
of ocrtarn Membcr States. u'hich src therr common dcfcnce reahscd rn NATO. undcr the North Atlantrc
Trcatl'ard bc compatrble urth the conrnon secuntv and dcfcncc pohcv cstabhshcd urthn that fiamovork,
HAVE AGREED UPON the follourng pro!'rsron. u'tuch rs anncxed to the Trcatl'on European Uruon,
Thc Europcan Uruon shall drau'up, togcther urth thc Westem European Uruon. arrangemcnts for
cnhanced coopcratlon betrr cen them- urtlm a vcar from thc cntn' urto forcc of the 'frcatv of Amsterdam "
IN,IPRINIERIE O EIENqONNAISE
Rue Edouard-Behn,1' tnnte\tre 1997
N'd'ordrt- : .10506
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